# Ignition Security Exploit Advisory **URL:** \ **Category:** Ignition\ **Created:** [April 21, 2020, 3:31pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078 "2020-04-21T15:31:45Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 7\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![TimE](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/ee59a6/32.png) [@TimE](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/u/TimE)\ **Post date:** [April 21, 2020, 3:31pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078/1 "2020-04-21T15:31:45Z")
I received an alert from our IT department, US-CERT email.Here is the link. [https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-112-01](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-112-01) Has this been addressed with the latest version 8.0.11? Is V7 affected at all? Thanks? ## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - **CVSS v3 9.1** - **ATTENTION:** Exploitable remotely/low skill level to exploit - **Vendor:** Inductive Automation - **Equipment:** Ignition 8 Gateway - **Vulnerability:** Improper Access Control ## 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to write endless log statements into the database, which could result in a denial-of-service condition. ## 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS ### 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following versions of Ignition 8 Gateway are affected if running the Perspective Module: - Ignition 8 Gateway versions prior to 8.0.10 ### 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW #### 3.2.1 [IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROLS CWE-284](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html) An unprotected logging route may allow an attacker to write endless log statements into the database without space limits or authentication. This results in consuming the entire available hard-disk space, causing a denial-of-service condition. [CVE-2020-10641](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2020-10641) has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.1 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ([AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H)). ### 3.3 BACKGROUND - **CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS:** Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Information Technology - **COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED:** United States - **COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION:** United States ### 3.4 RESEARCHER Sharon Brizinov and Mashav Sapir from Claroty reported this vulnerability to Inductive Automation and CISA. ## 4. MITIGATIONS Inductive Automation recommends the following mitigation: - Upgrade Ignition 8 Gateway to [v8.0.10](https://inductiveautomation.com/downloads/) The following workarounds are suggested if users cannot upgrade to v8.0.10 or above: - If running the Perspective Module, set “perspective.routes” to a priority level of WARN or higher. The exploit triggers the code path that logs a message with priority level INFO. - For gateways that are deployed behind a web application firewall or reverse proxy, deploy a rule to deny access to all gateway HTTP requests that include the path: /data/perspective/print-to-log. CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should: - Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure that they are [not accessible from the Internet](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01). - Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network. - When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures. CISA also provides a section for [control systems security recommended practices](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/recommended-practices) on the ICS webpage on [us-cert.gov](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics). Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including [Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies](https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf). Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the [ICS webpage on us-cert.gov](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics) in the Technical Information Paper, [ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B). Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents. No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability. ## Contact Information For any questions related to this report, please contact the CISA at: Email: [CISAservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov](mailto:cisaservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov) Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870 For industrial control systems cybersecurity information: [https://www.us-cert.gov/ics](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics) or incident reporting: [https://www.us-cert.gov/report](https://www.us-cert.gov/report) CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product. ---
**Author:** ![paul-griffith](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/inductiveautomation/user_avatar/forum.inductiveautomation.com/paul-griffith/32/37249_2.png) [@paul-griffith](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/u/paul-griffith)\ **Post date:** [April 21, 2020, 3:45pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078/2 "2020-04-21T15:45:29Z")
> [@TimE](#): > > Has this been addressed with the latest version 8.0.11? > Is V7 affected at all? Yes, and no, in that order; the 'Affected Products' section of the report is accurate: > [@TimE](#): > > ### 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS > > The following versions of Ignition 8 Gateway are affected if running the Perspective Module: > > - Ignition 8 Gateway versions prior to 8.0.10 ---
**Author:** ![TimE](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/ee59a6/32.png) [@TimE](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/u/TimE)\ **Post date:** [April 21, 2020, 5:05pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078/3 "2020-04-21T17:05:36Z")
That’s what I thought but wanted to get verification. Thanks! ---
**Author:** ![pturmel](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/inductiveautomation/user_avatar/forum.inductiveautomation.com/pturmel/32/3295_2.png) [@pturmel](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/u/pturmel)\ **Post date:** [April 21, 2020, 7:49pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078/4 "2020-04-21T19:49:58Z")
This could also be mitigated, along with all similar attacks, by setting `wrapper.logfile.maxsize=` to a non-zero value in wrapper.conf. ---
**Author:** ![brandon1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/ea666f/32.png) [@brandon1](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/u/brandon1)\ **Post date:** [April 21, 2020, 8:55pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078/5 "2020-04-21T20:55:56Z")
When the maxsize is set to a non-zero value does that mean the log file just stops being appended to or is the oldest event removed like a circular buffer? Also what is the units on that value. Is it max number of logged events or a size in bytes? Thanks. ---
**Author:** ![Kevin.Herron](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/inductiveautomation/user_avatar/forum.inductiveautomation.com/kevin.herron/32/7259_2.png) [@Kevin.Herron](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/u/Kevin.Herron)\ **Post date:** [April 21, 2020, 9:16pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078/6 "2020-04-21T21:16:39Z")
The max size is already set and there are comments explaining the values a bit: ```auto # Maximum size that the log file will be allowed to grow to before # the log is rolled. Size is specified in bytes. The default value # of 0, disables log rolling. May abbreviate with the 'k' (kb) or # 'm' (mb) suffix. For example: 10m = 10 megabytes. wrapper.logfile.maxsize=10m # Maximum number of rolled log files which will be allowed before old # files are deleted. The default value of 0 implies no limit. wrapper.logfile.maxfiles=5 ``` ---
**Author:** ![Kevin.Herron](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/inductiveautomation/user_avatar/forum.inductiveautomation.com/kevin.herron/32/7259_2.png) [@Kevin.Herron](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/u/Kevin.Herron)\ **Post date:** [April 21, 2020, 9:18pm UTC](https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/ignition-security-exploit-advisory/34078/7 "2020-04-21T21:18:06Z")
The sqlite db that holds log entries also rolls over by default and does not grow unbounded in size. I’m not sure this advisory was completely accurate. It would let an unauthenticated attacker fill/spam your logs, but I don’t think there was ever a risk of filling the HD unless you had configured your logs to be unbounded in size. edit: the way rollover is implemented for the logs that go into the DB actually does leave a window where there’s a real risk of filling the HD. So the advisory is not as inaccurate as I thought.